Abstract-The deployment of complex autonomous underwater platforms for marine science comprises sequential steps each of which is critical to mission success. Here we present a state transition approach, in the form of a Markov chain, which models step sequence from prelaunch to operation to recovery. The aim is to identify states and state transitions presenting high risk to the vehicle and hence to the mission, based on evidence and judgment. Developing a Markov chain consists of two separate tasks. The first defines the structure that encodes event sequence. The second assigns probabilities to each possible transition. Our model comprises 11 discrete states, and includes distance-dependent underway survival statistics. Integration of the Markov model with underway survival statistics allows us to quantify success likelihood during each state and state transition, and consequently the likelihood of achieving desired mission goals. To illustrate this generic process, the fault history of the Autosub3 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) provides the information for different operation phases. In our proposed method, faults are discriminated according to the mission phase in which they took place.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
ANY marine science programs involve deployment and recovery of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) or undersea gliders. Deployment sequence from prelaunch checks to operation in the water to recovery consists of a series of phases, each having an associated loss risk. Risk is highest when a vehicle is submerged, but all phases carry some risk; even on deck there is a possibility of loss due to electrical fire. Significant risks attend launch, and especially recovery [1] . However, system repair is possible after a fault, failure, or incident from all phases unless leading to loss or scrapping.
Although several studies have attempted to quantify the overall risks of underwater vehicle deployment [2] - [7] , until now no framework has been proposed for a risk analysis by mission phase. Here we propose a Markov chain approach to model risk in different phases and to quantify risk for different scenarios. Markov chains were chosen because analytical results associated with the model facilitate analysis of the operating sequences before they are generated, indicating how the operation is likely to unfold. Furthermore, the approach allows for the essential statistical dependence between phases. The Markov model was implemented in Matlab version 12 [8] .
An early engineering use of Markov chain theory was to estimate the reliability of hardware systems carrying out a simple task in a fixed environment [9] . The approach was extended to model multiphased systems [10] ; systems that either change structure, or whose failure characteristics change during an operation. Although the Markov chain presented here models a structure (vehicle) that does not change, the failure characteristics do alter through transitions between phases of the deployment process. For example, hazards during launch and recovery differ greatly from those when the vehicle is underway. Markov chains have recently been integrated with other mathematical approaches, such as Bayesian theory, Monte Carlo methods, and event trees [11] , [12] , providing insights that could not be obtained using Markov chains alone.
Here we extend the formalism by embedding distance-related survival statistics into a Markov chain model. We apply the model to analyze AUV mission risks, drawing extensively on reliability data of the Autosub3 AUV [7] . However, our approach could be applied to any vehicle.
The Markov chain representing an AUV deployment sequence requires estimates for the transition probabilities. Griffiths and Trembranis [6] described an elicitation exercise for Autosub3 in which experts were asked to assign a probability of vehicle loss for each of 63 faults or incidents. It was possible to assign particular state transitions to many of the elicited probabilities. However, they were not sufficient to populate all transitions of the proposed chain. For example, the study did not fully cover prelaunch tests or incidents, salvage or scrapping. Therefore, where possible, we elicited judgments from two experienced Autosub engineers for transition probabilities unobtainable from the wider study.
Throughout this paper, "state" refers a state of the Markov model, and "phase" refers to a phase of the deployment process. There is a one-to-one correspondence between a state and a phase.
We present four examples illustrating applications of the approach and the nature of the analysis that can be supported by the Markov formalism. This includes estimating loss probability at different phases and answers to questions an operator might ask of the model.
II. MARKOV CHAIN FORMALISM
In classical probability theory, a set of possible outcomes is given, each associated with a probability , ; the joint probability is defined by the multiplicative property . Markov chain theory simplifies this expression by assuming that the outcome of any trial depends on the outcome of the preceding trial 1 and only on it [13] . Thus, instead of associating a probability to an event, it associates a probability to a pair of events. For every pair of events , there is a corresponding transition probability , where is the probability of occurring given that occurred in the previous trial. According to Markov chain theory, in addition to , one must also define the probability of occurring at the initial trial . For the initial trial, therefore, . For the general case, considering a sequence of many transitions, given that event precedes which precedes and so on for the remaining events, the joint probability distribution is computed using (1) A sequence of trials with possible outcomes is called a Markov chain if the probabilities of sample sequences are defined by (1) . If a state has more than one preceding state, transition probabilities are arranged in a "transition" or "stochastic" matrix [12] [see (2) ], where the transition probability together with the initial state vector completely defines the Markov chain (2) Considering the stochastic transition matrix in (2) , is the probability of moving from state 0 to state 1, is the probability of going from state 0 to state , and is the probability of the system not leaving state in the next step. The stochastic matrix is useful to study the probability of a sequence of steps taking place before the sequence is generated, and is the basis of the analyses in Section IV.
III. MARKOV CHAIN STATE MODEL FOR AUV OPERATIONS
The deployment process is represented as a sequence of discrete states. The time spent in each state is not critical, except when underway, which we deal with differently. When underway, time is considered proportional to distance, hence distance is an input to a model of survival statistics. However, some underway missions break the link between distance and time, for example, if the AUV hovers or changes speed, thus survival statistics should be computed as function of time. Nevertheless, the same statistical survival estimator can be used. Other applications of Markov models have used the concept of sojourn time to model the time spent in each state [12] . Because insufficient information exists to model the time taken for AUV deployment, it is assumed here that the operators take as much time as required in each state.
A. The Markov Chain Model
The Markov chain model of an AUV deployment process comprises 11 states (X1-X11); corresponding to 11 possible deployment phases (Fig. 1 ). Node names are abbreviated to facilitate model description and subsequent analysis. Where faults or incidents can lead to loss, we provide real examples, most of which have not been documented in the peer-reviewed literature. This model has been synthesized from the known states and state transitions of several different AUVs and the experiences of several operators.
The deployment process starts at the initial pretest state , with the vehicle embarked onto a ship, or delivered to a launch site. The vehicle is ready to be tested. If a problem is detected, the transition is a loop back to the pretest state, implying fault identification and rectification before another test is carried out in an attempt to transition to the next state. For simplicity, we have assumed here that prior states such as preparation at base or selection of the operations team are subsumed into the statistics of the phases listed. In reality, the selection of the operations team can affect all subsequent phases, which cannot be modeled using the Markov approach alone. In this case, a Bayesian formulation could be used for updating the transition probabilities in light of new observations concerning the experience of the deployment team.
The next state is the post-test state, ready to launch . Successfully taking the vehicle into the water takes the vehicle to the overboard state . Problems can occur in this state necessitating recovery or they can lead to damage, for example, due to a fire or an explosion in the energy source; the possibility of having to salvage the vehicle given that the vehicle is ready to launch is represented with the transition from state to salvaged . From overboard , the vehicle is ready for predive checks. If the AUV passes all predive checks on the surface, a command is sent to the AUV to start diving . If these checks are not passed, the decision may be made to recover the vehicle . Operations on the surface next to the deployment platform carry significant risk [1] . There is the possibility that the AUV will be lost, for example, if caught by the vessel's propeller, as has happened to a Norwegian AUV. New risks emerge during the dive . For example, failure of a stern plane actuator can result in an uncontrolled dive, a situation that led to temporary loss of Autosub2 in the Celtic Sea. The Markov chain model captures temporary loss with the link . During the dive to the holding/test pattern phase , if necessary, it is possible to send an "abort to surface" signal facilitating possible recovery.
The first dive takes the vehicle to a holding/test pattern phase , while the telemetry is assessed. If faults are indicated, the vehicle can be recovered, but with a risk of loss. All well, the vehicle proceeds with its mission, transitioning to an underway state . The subsequent states are either recovery or loss . The lost state is either permanent, as was the case with Autosub2 under an ice shelf [14] , or there is a probability that a lost vehicle may be salvaged , for example, using a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) [15] , or after being fortuitously found . The latter may take place many months after the loss, as was the case in 2007, when a U.K. Royal Navy Remus100 was found after ten months at sea. The permanently lost state is shown by the link from to itself. The recovery may not proceed to plan, hence a link to loss . Following either salvage or found , the decision may be to scrap the vehicle as being beyond economic repair , as happened with a Fetch vehicle from the University of Delaware, Newark. Alternatively, the vehicle may be repaired and reused, as happened with the BAE Systems Merlin (Waterlooville, United Kingdom) after being found on shore. The latter is captured with the links to the initial state . The scrapped phase is terminal. For each transition, there is an associated sequence of events or conditions that must be met. A list of the conditions associated with each transition is presented in Table I .
The probability of the process going through a sequence of states is computed by manipulation of the transition matrix. The transition matrix that corresponds to the Markov chain of Fig. 1 is presented in (3), shown at the bottom of the page.
Only those elements with probabilities set out in Table I are nonzero. The 1 for element signifies a terminal state.
B. Incorporating Transition Probabilities
Having set out a topology for the Markov chain that represents the life cycle of AUV deployments, the next stage is to FIG. 1 determine the transition probabilities. The transitions probabilities are unique, for each AUV and for each team of operators. These could be established through hard evidence: through the frequentist approach of logging the frequency of occurrence. However, in practice, this will rarely be the case and indeed may not necessarily be the best approach. Hard evidence is obtained easily, from operators' notebooks, for transition probabilities before the vehicle enters the water, such as and . These are very likely to be probabilities determined overwhelmingly by the vehicle systems alone. In contrast, once overboard, the transition probabilities are influenced by many other human (4) and environmental factors. Hence, there is a fundamental choice of whether to populate the matrix with hard evidence probabilities applicable only to the set of circumstances appertaining to each event (fault or incident) or whether to generalize beyond the specific case. Such a generalization can be achieved by eliciting expert judgment for the probabilities [16] , as we did here.
Although we draw on experience with Autosub3, the principles are not specific to any vehicle. Brito et al. [17] developed an Autosub3 risk model based on its failure and incident history. First, it was imperative, where possible, to associate failures with transition probabilities using the failure description. The results are presented in the Appendix, and in aggregated form in Table II , where they are indicated as EJ (Group).
The transition probability is calculated using the extended Kaplan-Meier statistical estimator as a function of mission distance [7] . The mathematical expression is given in (4) where is the range, is the probability judgment of loss from the experts, and is the failure index number. The variable replaces the censor flag used by the original Kaplan-Meier formulation [18] . Through the Markov condition, is obtained from . Table II presents the underway survival data for an open-water environment for Autosub3. The calculated survival distribution is depicted in Fig. 2 .
The distribution shows that, for a distance of 80 km, the probability of survival is 0.97, therefore, . The transition probability from the reduced data set used here is Table III. between the optimistic and pessimistic estimates of previous analyses [17] .
C. Incorporating Expert Judgment
Some of the remaining transition probabilities were obtained from the expert judgment of two experienced Autosub3 engineers, with prior experience in assigning event probabilities [14] , [19] . Their judgments were aggregated using equal weight linear opinion pool [20] (Table III) , indicated as EJ(McP-S). The group of experts (B-G) is formed by the authors of this paper.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROCESS-FOUR EXAMPLES
In this section, we show how analysis of the Markov chain can address questions relevant to the risk quantification of the entire deployment or parts of a deployment. The results are used by engineers to identify possible risk mitigation activities and by managers to make operational decisions.
We outline four examples directly relevant to the management of an AUV deployment. These are 1) assessing availability; 2) planning ahead for all possible instances when recovery might be required; 3) estimating the probability of successful retrieval of the vehicle, not only from a successful mission but from any state; and 4) estimating the likely working life of the vehicle.
A. Availability
Especially for industry and defense applications, it is important that the operator have a good estimate of the probability that the AUV will be able to set off on a mission when required. In the Markov topology, availability is the probability of the operation running directly from state to state For Autosub3, this is 0.75. As a result, the probability of not completing this sequence is 0.25. This figure is affected by a number of factors, such as the vehicle payload and the amount of testing before the start of the mission. Our experts considered such factors when assigning probability transitions. Although this may seem low, it is only slightly lower than the average of the U.S. military UAVs listed in [21] , Table IV. A reasonable availability target for a unique or low-volumebuild AUV would be 0.8 based on this comparison, which could be achieved through analysis of fault and incident data and remedial engineering work. From this analysis, the transition probability is the lowest probability transition in the sequence and is consequently the area most likely to result in improvement through a more rigorous testing process. An increase of 7% in would raise to 0.80.
B. Recovering an AUV
Recovering the vehicle entails many risks, and is a mission phase for which some insurers require coinsurance [1] . Collision with the vessel is one potential risk. High seas can complicate this phase, especially for long-range AUVs, because mission often take 24 h or more and sea conditions can change rapidly.
The Markov formalism allows us to compute the probability of having to recover the vehicle for all the sequences. In actuality, there are two subsets. The first subset comprises those instances where there is a need to recover the vehicle given it has reached the preceding state. These are simply single elements from Table III . Thus, the probabilities of needing to recover immediately following phase are: overboard ; postdive ; holding/test pattern ; and underway . Despite the fact that a higher number of tests take place during the holding/pattern phase, historically, more failures occur during the diving phase, meaning that the vehicle will more often be recovered during the diving phase than during holding/pattern phase. Recovery is most likely after the end of a mission.
The second subset examines the probability of needing to recover the vehicle over a span of two or more states, or via two or more routes. For example, the operator may be keen to know the probability of having to recover a vehicle once overboard if it is not able to set out on its mission. That is, what is the probability of reaching via either , , or ? 1) Recovery from overside 2) Recovery from dive 3) Recovery from holding pattern Thus, the probability of having to recover the vehicle following phases , or is 0.0498.
C. Surviving the Deployment
Once the vehicle is underway, the probability of vehicle loss is calculated using distance-related survival statistics only [see (4) ]. However, a mission comprises several nonunderway phases and the benefit of our approach is that it provides an estimate of the probability of the vehicle surviving each phase of the deployment. The successful completion of a mission (failure-free mission) results in an increase in vehicle reliability, hence the transition probabilities need to be updated. Likewise, if failures occur the transition probabilities must be updated.
A successful mission corresponds to a direct sequence
Using the Markov assumption
That is, before the start of the onboard testing, the operator calling on the use of Autosub3 can expect a 0.72 probability of recovery after a successful mission. This is the "trouble-free" sequence. Of course, the overall probability of loss is not 1-0.72 or 0.38, as availability (0.75) is a major factor. The probabilities of vehicle loss immediately following phase are: overboard ; postdive ; holding/test pattern ; and underway . A key question is, "What is the path that is most likely to lead to vehicle loss?" The probability for each sequence is presented as follows. 
D. Decommissioning the Vehicle and Estimated Working Life
Possible scrappage is considered by AUV operators following salvage or discovery of the vehicle after temporary loss. Scrapping, or recycling, can result in additional costs and the probability of this happening can be estimated using the Markov approach. This state can be reached from any of the seven starting points (Table V) .
There is probability of having to scrap the vehicle given that the vehicle has been lost. This comes as no surprise. More interestingly, even though the path is shorter than the path , the probability of having to scrap the vehicle is lower if the deployment is at state ; the probability of having to scrap the vehicle given that the deployment is at state is . The node state (vehicle scrapped) is an absorbing state, as it is not possible to jump from state to any other state. The probability of reaching an absorbing state always increases with the number of transitions until the process is totally absorbed by this state. The number of transitions to total absorption is an indication of the likely working life of the vehicle. This estimate is presented in the fundamental matrix of the absorbing Markov chain [13] . The fundamental matrix of an absorbing chain is , where matrix represents transitions among transient states and matrix is the identity matrix of the same size as . Matrix is obtained by removing row 11 and column 11 from matrix in (3) to give (5) , shown at the bottom of the page. The first row in the fundamental matrix informs us that, assuming the process starts in state 1, on average the process would pass 94.5 times in state 1, 82.7 times in state 2, 79.3 times in state 3, and so on for the remaining states, before being absorbed by state . In this case, using the same vehicle, with no maintenance or replacement of components, the vehicle would most likely carry out 72 underway missions before it ended up scrapped. At first, this figure may seem pessimistic; after all Autosub2 was lost after 216 successful missions. However, halfway through its 47th mission, Autosub3 collided with the underside of Pine Island Glacier, Antarctica. This caused structural damage to the vehicle and although Autosub3 survived the mission, an expert judgment elicitation estimated that the probability of surviving such an incident was only 0.42 [22] . In light of this event, the estimate of 72 underway missions before being scrapped appears more reasonable. The remaining rows of the fundamental matrix are not relevant for lifetime analysis. If we were to use the data in these rows for our lifetime analysis, we would be assuming that the process starts from a state other than .
V. DISCUSSION
The proposed Markov model provides a useful approach for estimating the risks during phases in an AUV deployment. Its graphical structure injects transparency, which facilitates process criticism and improvement for each phase. Our approach applies to any AUV, regardless of size or mode of operation, for example, gliders 2 or hybrid AUV-ROV.
Although the underway transition probability in our case is calculated based on distance traveled, in some operations, time may be more suitable. This is the case for vehicles that can stop, hover, or change speed. For all these cases, the underway survival statistics would be calculated on operating time.
Future work should seek to add other variables, such as operating depth, as covariates for the underway probability of survival estimation. Statistical modeling methods, such as the Cox proportional hazards model, can be used for estimating whether those covariates are important. For Autosub3, we concluded that 2 A type of AUV with buoyancy change engine. (5) TABLE VI  TABLE OF MISSIONS, DISTANCES, FAULTS WITH COMMENTS AND STATE CLASSIFICATIONS there was no correlation between depth and failure rate. However, a different conclusion might be obtained for deeper diving vehicles, such as Nereus [23] or Autosub6000 [24] .
It is not unusual for users to design a campaign so that the vehicle performs several short missions, without the need for changing or charging the batteries, for instance, and thus, obviating the need to return to the vessel. Although we have not provided an example capturing this scenario, the probability rule should be used for estimating combined probability survival for the states actually involved. Again the proposed formalism still applies.
While the vehicle is on deck, it would be feasible to add time as a covariate in this analysis. Time is often at a premium at sea, and questions such how long vehicle tests may take or how long might recovery take after a failed deployment are common. Sojourn time at each state has not been modeled here, due to lack of data. Future work seeking to address this problem would need to draw upon more detailed records. There is a case for a common form of structured record keeping for AUV deployments, informed by this Markov chain topology, so that individual and comparative statistics can be obtained.
Our approach can provide more detailed risk estimates, but verification of the absolute and relative probabilities is difficult. It can be helped through feedback of the results to those from whom judgments have been elicited and subsequent revision to probability estimates, as done here. A second stage might com- Last, the vehicle's configuration is likely to introduce constraints on the reliability, and as a consequence, introduce changes to mission risk. Maturity of the vehicle's configuration will also influence mission risk. These phenomena are not captured in the proposed approach, however it is clear from UAV reliability analysis that risk may decrease markedly between a concept demonstrator and a production vehicle [21] . Future work should seek to model how different AUV configurations and maturity may influence operational risk. A Bayesian approach for updating transition probabilities should provide a suitable solution. APPENDIX See Table VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to thank ten AUV experts from outside the United Kingdom that gave freely of their time in assessing the fault history of Autosub3. Their work provided the baseline probabilities without which this work would not have been possible. They would like to especially thank the Autosub technical team for their source data on faults and incidents. The authors would also like to thank S. McPhail and P. Stevenson for providing the judgments that helped populate most of the transition probabilities presented in this paper. 
